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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS , "IMPROVING FUNCTIONAL AREA 50, THE ARMY'S FORCE MANAGERS" (FACILITATING THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE AT THE SPEED OF CHANGE)
As we enter the 21st century the buzzword in the Army is "transformation". Everything is transforming. We are transforming our operational or combat forces. These forces are becoming lighter and more deployable, yet more survivable. They are becoming more lethal, yet more sustainable. We are increasing the number of our combat forces while reducing the numbers of our combat support and combat service support forces.
We are also transforming our institutional Army. We are examining our TDA Army in order to determine if some of these military spaces can be used in our operational forces. We are determining whether specific functions remain essential to the Army. If they are essential, should they be done by soldiers or can the positions be converted from military to civilian positions? If civilians can do it, can the task be contracted out?
The initial 25 years of this century will arguably see the most significant change that our Army has ever experienced. Further, this change will be increasingly rapid. The Army relies on Force Management to manage this change. Army Force Management is composed of processes, organizations, and dedicated individuals. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) examines whether Army Force Management, and specifically the Functional Area 50 program and those officers designated with the 50A specialty, is adequate to manage the transformation of the Army in a timely fashion. It recommends changes to make the Functional Area 50 program more effective and efficient in order to enable the Army to better manage change at the speed of change and thus to achieve our transformation goals.
This SRP provides background information by reviewing some recent historical examples of organizational change in the Army and the problems associated with these changes. It describes the Functional Area 50 program and reviews its proponent, its education and training system, and its force structure. It concludes with specific recommendations for strengthening the Functional Area 50 program.
BACKGROUND
A transformed U.S. force must be matched by a support structure that is equally agile, flexible, and innovative. It must be a structure in which each of DoD's dedicated civilian and military members can apply their talents to defend America… -Donald Rumsfeld Change is nothing new for the Army. The environment in which we operate changes constantly. In response to these environmental changes, the Army adapts by assigning new missions to its forces. As these missions change, the resources required to execute these missions may also change. At the same time technology changes. The Army selectively modernizes its forces with innovative technology. To remain viable, the Army is a dynamic organization which continually changes to overcome threats to our nation's security and to capitalize on improvements to technology.
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In an effort to manage this change, the Army relies on a series of processes, organizations, and people known collectively as Army Force Management. Army Force Management includes a wide range of functions, but generally encompasses the following four related areas: Force Development, which continually determines Army requirements and translates them into programs and structure; Force Integration, which executes approved force development programs; Force Modernization, which continually improves the Army's force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration; and finally Force Management, the capstone process which establishes and fields mission-ready organizations in response to the three previously mentioned components.
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During the last two decades of the 20th century the Army experienced two significant eras of change. First, in the 1980s, in an effort to improve readiness and to posture the Army for prompt and sustained combat operations against the current Soviet threat, there was an unprecedented amount of change. During this period there was a significant increase in equipment acquisitions as over 400 new types of systems entered the Army. These equipment acquisitions, such as the Abrams Tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System, in turn drove changes to doctrine, training, personnel, and organizations. As the Army attempted to implement these significant changes, a large number of problems emerged in the area of systems and processes used to manage change. As a result, the Army leadership directed that the Department of the Army Inspector General conduct special inspections to monitor force modernization and management. The initial inspection was conducted in 1983, with a follow-up inspection in 1986. source, the 50A program was not well managed. The other training program was a one-week, macro-level course on how the Army runs. It was targeted for senior Army personnel on the Department of the Army Staff and all newly promoted General Officers and Department of the Army Civilian Senior Executive Service personnel. Armed with these improvements, the Army closed out the decade of the 1980's.
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Then in the 1990s, the Army experienced another series of sweeping changes. This time, responding to the fall of the Soviet threat, there were significant resource reductions, which in turn led to force reductions. Once again there were problems in how the Army attempted to manage this change. The Army leadership directed that another force management study be done. This study was conducted from late 1992 to late 1993 by a contractor, Military Professional Resources Incorporated, and the recommendations were implemented in January 1994. As was the case with the previous Department of the Army Inspector General special inspections, the force management study determined that there was still a problem with understanding how the Army runs. The Army leadership was determined to solve the problem.
The same contractor that conducted the force management study was later awarded a contract to establish the Army Force Management School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This school would provide personnel trained in how the Army runs at the action officer level. This organization was also directed to assume the training responsibility for the one-week training of senior Department of the Army personnel and all newly promoted General officers and Department of the Army Civilian Senior Executive Service personnel. As part of the implementation of the Force Management Study, the 50A program was disestablished. Officers who had the 50A designator as a secondary officer specialty were changed to another specialty. Additionally, newly trained military force managers were awarded a "3R" additional skill identifier. It was not until the implementation of the OPMS XXI study in 1997 that the 50A designation returned as part of the newly created Functional Area 50 program.
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As the Army embarks on its transformation strategy, the change inherent in that strategy and the rapidity with which that change will occur will require close and continuous management by force managers. The leadership of the Army is relying on our force managers to minimize costs and ensure optimum use of scarce resources as we transform our Army while maintaining our readiness to fight and win our nation's wars. As we continue down the path of transformation, we should take note of opportunities to modify our systems and streamline our processes in an effort to improve Army force management. It is interesting to note that, at the time the author was conducting his research, the G-8 had never been briefed by Mr. Ryan on the Functional Area 50 program. Consequently the G-8
has not issued any guidance to Mr. Ryan. Mr. Ryan did brief the former Director of Integration on a monthly basis, but there have been no meetings since the former Director's departure several months ago.
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This lack of personnel resources and guidance gives the appearance that Functional Area 50 is being ignored. Even worse, on the day that the author was at Fort Belvoir interviewing Mr.
Ryan, there were six colonels attending a class in the Army Force Management School, each a division chief within the G-8. These officers all voiced concern over the documentation of their division chief positions as 50A positions rather than basic branch positions; they wanted the positions converted back to basic branch officer specialties. 10 The apparent reason for this concern is that the systems these officers manage tend to relate to specific operational career fields. Their position being that basic branch or operations career field officers would be better suited to these positions rather than 50A officers. When senior members of the G- The Functional Area 50 program laid out in DA PAM 600-3 appears to effectively address the requirement of providing the Army with a cadre of officers highly skilled in how the Army runs. There is a vestige of a proponent office to manage the program. However, the level of management and its effectiveness appear to be lacking.
THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM
We must explore new and faster ways to employ existing capabilities; more rapidly integrate select new technologies in fielded forces, and undertake organizational changes that increase the flexibility, utility, and effectiveness of the Joint Force. However, these local training programs should be reviewed by an authoritative source to ensure that proper terminology is used and that doctrine is being followed in these local programs. This current training shortfall is a significant detrimental factor in the performance of 50A officers.
Because much of the work done by force management officers is cyclical in nature, it may take a year or more for new officers to learn their jobs through the "school of hard knocks" or "on the job training". The various organizations within the Army which conduct force management activities must develop local training programs and ensure newly arrived officers are thoroughly in-processed and certified by their leadership to enhance their abilities to execute their assigned tasks in accordance with standard operating procedures and current force management doctrine. Without these training programs, the Army is protracting the time required to develop the cadre of officers skilled in how the Army runs.
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FUNCTIONAL AREA 50 FORCE STRUCTURE
The imperative for organizations to remain viable in an environment of change is to understand and manage change. To correct this documentation problem additional 50A positions should be added to each TRADOC proponent Directorate of Combat Developments. This is not to say that all positions must be 50A, only that some positions should be added or converted. Also, the positions should be standardized across these directorates. For example, an individual directorate of combat developments might document one colonel, two lieutenant colonel, and four major positions as 50As. In all of these cases the exact number and grade of 50A officers should be determined between the Functional Area 50 proponent and TRADOC. Army-wide conversion of all combat development officer positions to 50A could not be supported at this time, but could be phased in over time. Since any addition to an authorization document will require an off setting reduction elsewhere, existing basic branch positions could be converted, thus limiting force structure growth as we correct the combat developments documentation disconnect. The same procedure could then be used with other disconnects, such as with organizational and systems integrators.
DA PAM 600-3 also states that functional area 50 officers should serve as organizational and systems integrators. proponent should oversee this effort and establish a mechanism for periodic review and solicitation of comments from the field.
The Functional Area 50 web page appears to be an excellent tool. It contains a wealth of information pertinent to 50A officers. The web page can be found at, <http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/fa50/>. This tool should be leveraged by the proponent to support updates to DA PAM 600-3 and for opening a dialogue with 50A officers in the field.
Anyone should be able to enter the web page and submit a question. They should receive feedback indicating their question is received, and they should have at least an interim reply within two working days.
Improve
The initial decision should be whether or not the G-8 desires to remain the proponent for Local training programs could fill remaining shortfalls in the preparation of officers to assume their duties once they arrive at their permanent duty station. What is needed at these locations is essentially a course in tactics, techniques, and procedures for the force management officer. This information could be incorporated into existing standard operating procedures. In some cases local training programs are available, but the contents of these programs contain dated information and do not conform to current force management doctrine.
In many cases there is no local training program at all. These programs could be established at any level, but placing them initially at the Directorate level would ensure competent instructors and materiel which is pertinent to the action officer. However, the responsibility for overall This is not to imply that every officer position within the combat developments community has to be converted to 50A. Decisions on how many spaces will be converted, and when, reside with senior leadership. However, the number of conversions should reflect a fair share 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This SRP began with the assumption that one or two areas of the Functional Area 50 program needed improvement to posture the Army to achieve its transformation goals. But research revealed an Army standing at a crossroads, needing to decide whether to embrace and enhance the Functional Area 50 program, or to terminate it and re-designate its officers into other branches or career fields.
Should the Army decide to embrace the Functional Area 50 program and resource it more adequately, this SRP has highlighted several areas which where much progress can be made.
It has also identified areas which could be improved. The best interests of the Army, the force management organizations within the Department of Defense, and the individual officers of the Functional Area 50 program will be served by the recommendations of this SRP. The key to success and to fully implementing these recommendations is a strong and involved proponent.
The Functional Area 50 program is indisputably essential to the success of our Army, particularly during this ongoing period of transformation. The recommendations set forth in this SRP to optimize the functional area 50 program will posture the Army to manage change at the speed of change and achieve our transformation goals.
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